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This is a time of trouble for the federal income tax. In accepting his
party's nomination for the Presidency, Mr. Carter said:
It's time for a complete overhaul of our income tax system. I still tell you
it's a disgrace to the human race. All my life I have heard promises of
tax reform, but it never quite happens. With your help, we are finally
going to make it happen and you can depend on it,!
If the federal income tax has been converted since Mr. Carter's election
from "a disgrace to the human race" into one of the glories of Anglo-
American jurisprudence, .the changes have eluded my scrutiny. More
likely, the President, like his predecessors, has discovered that tax reform
is more appealing as a political slogan than as an agenda for action.
Moreover, he prudently qualifIed his promise by telling his listeners that
he would need "your help." Whether he referred to the delegates in the
convention hall or to the nationwide television audience, he clearly has
an escape hatch if sued for breach of promise. His performance was
subject to a condition precedent that is not likely to be satisfIed. Almost
everyone wants comprehensive tax reform, but resistance to particular
changes almost always outweighs this vague yearning for drastic programs.
But Candidate Carter's harsh words have plenty of support. The news-
papers, television and radio give us ample evidence of discontent, occa-
sionally even using the term "taxpayer rebellion." A journalist needing a
front page story will never fail if he or she takes a set of facts to a dozen
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tax preparation offices, or even revenue agents, and asks for a computation
of the hypothetical taxpayer's income tax liability. The answers are never
identical, and usually the spectrum range is very broad. To be sure,
Congress made several important changes in 1977 to alleviate this prob-
lem; 2 and these amendments, costing millions of dollars in revenue, will
show up prominently in statistical tables prepared by the IRS to reflect
the average number of errors per million tax returns filed. But for the
taxpaying individual, these contributions to simplicity are swamped in a
sea of residual complications. When the President announced the pro-
posals, SOme stock market analysts grew bearish on H. & R. Block stock,
long regarded as the leading member of a growth industry. They
theorized that the demand by taxpayers for assistance in preparing their
returns would decline if the rules were simplified; and the stock did drop
from $22.50 to $20 a share.s Within a few months, however, it had risen
to $25.75.
Aside from its complexity, the federal income tax arouses unremitting
oharges of unfairness. The deductible three-martini lunch that was casti-
gated by President Carter, for example, symbolizes a pervasive feeling
that the tax law discriminates unfairly in favor of some taxpayers and
against others.
This feeling is fueled-indeed, stimulated-by some of the federal in-
come tax's staunchest supporters.4 For two decades, for example, tax
theorists who are friendly to the federal income tax have pointed out that
the effective rate of tax varies widely among taxpayers in the same income
bra.::ket, depending on the use they make of tax shelters and other allow-
ances, and that the average effective rate for high income taxpayers is
much closer to the average rate paid by low inCome taxpayers than the
statutory rate schedules would lead one to expect. These statistical aver-
ages are enlivened and buttressed periodically by Treasury reports on the
number of individuals with adjusted gross incomes of $200,000 or more,
whose tax liability is trivial. Although an outside observer might attribute
these dramatic reports to a hostile administration seeking to repeal the
federal income tax as inherently unfair, they were in fact originally devised
by the Treasury in 1968 as part of a tax reform package deSigned to
strengthen the federal income tax.
In the same vein, assertions that the income tax is riddled with special
privileges, confers upside-down subsidies on favored groups of taxpayers,
2. E.g., the increase in the standard deduction and its conversion to the zero
bracket amount, for which see I.R.C. § 63( d). .
3. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1977, at 58, col. 3. The President announced a proposal
to increase the standard deduction on February 2, 1977. See 35 CONGo Q. WEEKLY
REp. 209, 210 (1977).
4. For citations and quotations, see Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political
Rhetoric, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (1973), and Bittker, Effective Tax Rates: Fact OT
Fancy? 122 U. PA. L. REv. 780 (1974).
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and is a $77 billion welfare program for the rich-though launched by
friends of the income tax in the hope of purging it of these deficiencies-
have undoubtedly helped to persuade millions of taxpayers that it is not
only unfair, but incurably so. Federal tax reformers have never trained
their heavy artillery on either the sales tax or the local property tax, and
it is not unusual for ordinary citizens to think that those taxes are more
equitable than the federal income tax, though that is hardly the conclusion
that tax reformers usually want to promote.
This sense of grievance is especially characteristic of middle-income
taxpayers-the same groups who feel that they are excluded from more
beneficent federal programs. Having concluded, rightly or wrongly, that
they have little power to change matters, they are more likely to lash out
at the federal income tax than to join a crusade to reform it. It is not
surprising, therefore, that efforts to build up a populist-inspired national
constituency for tax reform (e.g., by ex-Senator Fred Harris and Ralph
Nader) have not gotten off the ground, and that the McGovern "demo-
grant" proposal of 1972, designed as a response to rank-and-file discontent
with the federal tax law of the day, got no working class support.Ii
It is hard to assess the political importance of this generalized and un-
focused sense of unfairness. The term "taxpayer rebellion" may be only
a rhetorical Hourish, good for headlines but having no serious political
content. Perhaps the same can be said about the increase in litigation by
taxpayers who refuse to pay the federal income tax, asserting that it was
inspired by the Communist Manifesto, that it is unconstitutional, that fed-
eral reserve notes are not legal tender, or that taxpayers are required to
keep records in violation of the involuntary servitude clause of the thirteenth
amendment.6 An example of local interest is a claim that the sixteenth
amendment was not properly ratified by Ohio, because it did not become a
state until 1953, when Congress enacted a statute to settle a dispute about
the date of its entry into the union.7
Though foredoomed to fail, these lawsuits evidence some ingenuity on
the part of taxpayers. The fact that they are exercises in futility, how-
ever, does not mean that they should be C;lismissed out of hand as the
bizarre ruminations of cranks. Like the "taxpayer revolt" idea, they mani-
fest a discontent ripe for exploitation by a talented political operator.
Still another reason for reviewing the income tax landscape is provided
by the growing movement among tax theorists in favor of an expenditure
tax, i.e., a tax based on the amount that the taxpayer spends or consumes,
rather than on the amount that he earns.s So far, proposals to substitute
5. 30-2 CONGo Q. WEEKLY REp. 1332, 1333 (1972).
6. For examples, see United States v. ArIt, 567 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978); Lorre
v. Alexander, 40 A.F.T.R.2d 77-5677 (W.D. Tex. 1977); McCoy v. Alexander, 40
A.F.T.R.2d 77-5299 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
7. Baker V. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 307 (1978).
8. See Slitor, Administrative Aspects of Expenditures Taxation, in BROAD-BASED
TAXES: NEW OPTIONS AND SOURCES 227 (R. Musgrave ed. 1973), and sources there
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an expenditure tax for the federal income tax or to phase one in gradually,
and thus reduce the Treasury's reliance on the income tax, have hardly
emerged from the groves of academe. But the expenditure tax concept is
finding favor in disparate quarters, and they may succeed in forming a
potent coalition in the years ahead.
First, an influential group of economists and business analysts believes
that national savings and investment are too low relative to consumption,
and that this imbalance is rapidly getting worse because of inflation.
Since an expenditure tax would be imposed on consumption but not on
the portion of a taxpayer's income that was saved or invested, it would
encourage taxpayers to save rather than spend; this would help to reverse
the current bias-as these analysts would describe it- in favor of current
consumption.
Second, expenditure taxation is an appealing concept to another group:
those tax theorists who have always believed that the failure of existing
law to exclude savings from taxable income results in a misallocation of
resources by altering the taxpayer's pre-tax trade-off between savings and
consumption in favor of the latter. I refrain from summarizing their tech-
nical argument, partly because I am a lawyer rather than an economist,
but the details are no doubt familiar to many of you.
I should point out, however, that these theorists favor an expenditure
tax because it will be, in their view, neutral as between savings and con-
sumption. By contrast, the first group is less interested in neutrality than
in actively influencing the economic behavior of taxpayers; they favor
expenditure taxation as an affinnative instrument of governmental policy,
not merely as a device to restore the free play of market forces.
A third group attracted by the idea of taxing expenditures rather than
income consists of persons seeking to protect the environment against
waste. Although they are not especially enthusiastic about larger capital
outlays for industrial plant and equipment, they are even less partial to
current consumption.
A final element contributing to this burgeoning interest in expenditure
taxation is fear on the part of some tax theorists that the existing income
tax law cannot be purged of its complexities and inequities; they see too
many political hurdles, each manned by a potent vested interest. To them,
federal income tax reform is an impossible dream; as realists, they look
elsewhere for a fresh start. Like a newly minted coin, the expenditure
tax is free from defects.
I should now like to shift perspective and turn back to the formative
years of the federal income tax, primarily to assess the extent to which
the academic theorists and political figures who were responsible for the
early federal income tax laws foresaw the problems that we must now
grapple with.
cited; TREASURY DEPT., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 113 (1977); AndIews, A
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1113 (1974).
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Perhaps it is a mistake to unveil the conclusion of my probe into history
before setting out any of the details, but I am not a writer of detective
stories. My conclusion, in short, is that the founding fathers foresaw
almost none of the really troublesome issues that have plagued the federal
income tax for the last thirty or forty years. This suggests extreme caution
in assessing the merits of any proposed broad-based tax, such as the
expenditure tax, until much more thought has been devoted to its long-
range ramifications. It may well tum out that its proponents have seri-
ously underestimated its potential for complexity and unfairness and that,
however appealing as an ideal, it would if enacted soon be castigated as
another "disgrace to the human race."
The tax theorists who shaped the early history of the income tax-when
it occupied about the same status as the expenditure tax does today-
were preoccupied with only a few issues, most of which concerned the
outer limits of the concept of "income." One such issue was whether
gifts and bequests should be taxed as income to the recipient. There was
no consensus On this issue among theorists. Congress decided in 1913
against including gifts and bequests in the income tax base and there the
issue has rested ever since. Occasionally a theorist tries to reopen the
question, but I cannot recall any serious effort by tax reformers to alter
the 1913 decision on this point.
Another burning issue before World War I was whether the rental value
of owner-occupied residences should be includible in income. The legisla-
tive decision against inclusion has been consistently criticized by tax econo-
mists, but they have not succeeded in drumming up any backing on Capitol
Hill. A roundabout way of attacking the issue-repealing or restricting the
right of homeowners to deduct interest on their mortgages and local real
property taxes-has perhaps fared a little better, but only marginally so.
A third issue that piqued the interest of the early theorists was the
proper treatment of fringe benefits furnished by employers to their em-
ployees, especially if the normal market value exceeded the amount that
the employee would have spent if he or she were free of employer com-
pulsion. An example is the rental value of a residence supplied without
charge to a university president, prison warden or public official. Perhaps
a three-martini lunch also qualifies as an example, at least if the drinks
are consumed by a salesman who would prefer tomato juice, but who
thinks it better to be convivial with customers than to be puritanical. The
boundary between business and personal benefits and expenditures was
not settled in 1913 and remains veiled in obscurity to this day.9 The found-
ing fathers were bothered by it, but they were no more able to resolve
it than those who followed them.
9. For recent developments, see Overbeck, Fringe Benefits for Rank and File Em-
ployees. 55 TAXES 820 (1977).
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I could expand this summary, but its importance for present purposes
lies in the important areas that did not attract attention in the early days
of the federal income tax, rather than in the few that surfaced. Before
turning to the gaps, however, I should perhaps say that the attention of
the early legislators was focused almost exclusively on rates and exemp-
tions; they were rarely concerned with the composition of the tax base,
save for the politically explosive issue of interest on state and municipal
bonds.
Ever since the nineteen-twenties, a major problem in applying the fed-
eral income tax has been the proper treatment of devices used by tax-
payers to avoid the full impact of the progressive rate structure. By
transferring stocks, bonds and real estate to members of their families,
high income taxpayers have tried to shift the responsibility for reporting
the dividends, interest and rental income to their children and other low-
income relatives, thereby moving income from the donor's top bracket to
the donee's lower rate, which in some situations is zero. As is well known,
almost every arrangement known to the law-outright transfers, trusts,
partnerships, family corporations, foreign entities, etc.-has been em-
ployed in this endeavor, and Congress, the IRS and the courts have been
equally ingenious in responding to the challenge. The early theorists and
legislators were intensely concerned with the ethical, social and political
consequences of progressive rate structures, but they almost wholly over-
looked the diversity of countermeasures open to taxpayers.
The early history of the income tax was marked by a similar failure to
foresee another, closely related problem: the tax status of married couples.
The Revenue Act of 1913 taxed individuals, not married couples or fami-
lies, and this practice continued until 1948, when Congress authorized
married couples to me joint returns and thereby qualify for a special
"split" rate. But when Congress opted in 1913 for individualism, the
founding fathers seem to have disregarded the community property system
that prevailed in eight western and Pacific Coast states, where marriage
was viewed as a financial partnership, as well as an emotional one. Under
local law, each spouse's income, whether derived from wages, self-
employment, or investments, was owned 50-50 by husband and wife;
community property residents, naturally, immediately contended that they
were entitled to me tax returns accordingly.
It is extraordinary that this issue was not settled until 1930, when the
Supreme Court in Poe v. Seaborn upheld the right of community property
couples to divide their joint income for federal income tax purposes.lO The
result of this decision was that community property couples were auto-
matically protected against the full force of the progressive rate structure;
by contrast, their counterparts in common law states could do very little
10. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). See generally Bittker, Federal Income
Taxation and the FamUy, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389 (1975).
HeinOnline -- 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 191 1978
1978] TAX REFORM 191
to divide their earned income, and their ability to split investment income
for tax purposes was subject to many uncertainties, unless the richer spouse
made an absolute gift, with no strings attached, to the other spouse.
These disparities prevailed until 1948, when Congress authorized married
couples to file joint returns and to pay the same amount of tax as would
be paid by a community couple who reported their income equally on two
separate returns. The effect of the so-called income-splitting joint return
is that married couples with the same amount of income pay the same
tax whether they live in a community property or common law jurisdiction,
and without regard to the proportion in which they contribute to the ag-
gregate amount of income.
None of the problems leading up to the 1948 joint return were fore-
shadowed by the debates of the early tax theorists. A fortiori, they did
not foresee the residual problems that still plague us in this area, such as
the so-called "marriage tax" paid by some two-job married couples because
their joint liability is greater than the liability they would incur if un-
married, or its counterpart, the "singles tax," so-called because many un-
married taxpayers would pay less if they were married.
Another central problem in federal income taxation that was almost
wholly ignored in the early debates concerns the time when income is to be
reported. This issue can be subdivided into two components. First, tax-
payers do not take unrealized appreciation and depreciation into account
annually, but wait until the gain or loss is realized by sale, abandonment or
other event. By deferring the recognition of gains and losses until they are
realized, the tax law avoids the need for annual appraisals of the taxpayer's
assets, and it protects taxpayers against haVing to pay taxes on gains ("paper
profits") that have not yet been turned into cash. But these advantages have
an offsetting administrative cost: taxpayers oan often postpone or accelerate
transactions in order to fit them into taxable years when they will produce
the greatest tax benefit. Recognizing this, Congress has in turn imposed
numerous complicated restrictions on artificial and manipulative devices de-
signed to undercut the progressive rate structure.
The second component of the timing issue is that most taxpayers are
permitted to use the cash receipts and disbursements method of ac-
counting for income, instead of the more accurate accrual method. This
privilege eliminates a great deal of bookkeeping for millions of taxpayers,
many of whom do not even know that there is an alternative way to
compute income, but it also plays an important role in most tax shelters
and other manipulative arrangements to escape the fun force of the pro-
gressive rate structure. A familiar example is the deferral by prize-
fighters, actors, authors and other superstars of portions of their earned
income until retirement, when the taxpayer anticipates that other income
will decline so that the deferred amounts can be collected and reported
with less pain than if the income had been received and reported when
the services were performed.ll .
11. See note 9 supra.
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Still another feature of federal income taxation that escaped serious
attention in its formative years is the impact of treating corporations as
separate taxable entities. I must qualify this statement by acknowledging
that the Revenue Act of 1913 did tax the shareholders of a corporation on
its undistributed income if it was "formed or fraudulently availed of' to
protect its shareholders against the personal surtax by accumulating its
earnings instead of distributing them.12 This provision was soon con-
verted into a penalty tax on the corporation itself (the predecessor of cur-
rent I.R.C. section 531), but even in its original form it addressed only one
aspect of the separate relationship between corporations and their share-
holders, leaving a host of other troublesome issues to be worked out grad-
ually in later years.
Since the separate corporate income tax was enacted in 1909, four
years before the sixteenth amendment was ratified, perhaps the corporate
tax was simply carried forward in 1913 as an independent feature of the
tax landscape, with little regard to its relationship to the newly enacted
personal income tax. At any rate, the founding fathers either failed to
think about the impact of corporate distributions, liquidations, reorgani-
zations and other corporate transactions on the tax liability of individual
shareholders, or they deliberately passed the buck to future legislators.
Another unforeseen development was the distinction between capital
gains and ordinary income, which is often viewed with some accuracy
as the most important single source of complexity in today's federal income
tax laws. Indeed, the 1913 legislators had so rudimentary a level of
familiarity with the concept of income that they were puzzled about how to
determine gain on a simple sale of property, and this precluded any at-
tempt to grapple with more complicated notions, such as capital gains
and losses. As evidence, I cannot resist quoting part of an extended
argument in the Senate about the computation of profit on the sale of a
horse:
Mr. Cummins.. " [S]uppose 10 years ago I bought a horse for $900, and
this year I had sold him for $1,000, what would I do in the way of
making a [tax] retum?
Mr. Williams (a member of the Senate Finance Committee). . . . That
thousand dollars is a part of the Senator's receipts for this year, and being
a part of his receipts, that much will go in as part of his receipts, and from
it would be deducted his disbursements and his exemptions and various
other things.
Mr. Cummins. Would the price I paid for the horse originally be deducted?
Mr. Williams: No, because it was not a part of the transactions in that
year; but if the Senator turned around and bought another horse that year,
it would be deducted.
Mr. Bristow. Mr. President, I desire to ask a question, and see if I have
this matter clear in my mind. As I understood the question of the Senator
12. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 166.
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from Iowa, it was, if he bought a horse 10 years ago for $100--
Mr. Cummins. Nine hundred dollars.
Mr. Bristow. And sold it this year for a thousand dollars, whether or not
that thousand dollars would be counted as a part of his income for this
year, regardless of what he paid for the horse 10 years ago. Is that correct?
Mr. Williams. No; I did not say that. It would be a part of his l!T0ss
receipts for the year, of course, but it may not necessarily be a part of his
net receipts, and therefore not a part of his income that is taxable.
Mr. Cummins. But I asked the Senator from Mississippi specifically
whether, in the case I put, the price that was originally paid for the horse
could be deducted from the price received.
Mr. Williams. The price paid 10 years ago? No; of course not. How
could it? When a man puts in his return for his income of the previous
year in order to be taxed he puts down everything he has received and
everything he has paid out, subject to the exemption and limitations other-
wise provided in the bill. Necessarily that is so: To answer the Senator,
I want to read the precise language of the provision.1s
Needless to say, the provision that the Senator then read was too abstract
to be helpful-it provided that "the net income of a taxable person shall
include gains, profits, and income" from a variety of sources, including
"sales or dealings in property," without explaining how the amount of gain
was to be determined. In any event, a deliberative, assembly that was
preoccupied by the sale of a $1,000 horse could hardly be expected to
devote much attention to the more arcane aspects of the term "income,"
including the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income.
Finally, the founding fathers were thoroughly imbued with the view
that taxes should be levied for revenue only, a principle that was then
almost universally accepted. As a result, they failed to foresee that
Congress would come to use the federal income tax law as a major instru-
ment of economic and social policy. Though deplored by some in-
fluential commentators, the practice of using the Internal Revenue Code to
encourage building construction, business investment, research expenditures
and many other activities is deeply entrenched and is not likely, in my
opinion, to be reversed in the foreseeable future. Whether this prediotion
is correct or not, my purpose today is simply to record the fact that this
astonishing growth in the use of tax allowances as incentives was not
-anticipated when the federal income tax was in its infancy.
B. WHERE WE ARE TODAY
In this section I want to concentrate on several aspects of today's tax law.
I will argue that, whether it is a national disgrace or not, it is far more
rational than its critics often allege, that its complexities are difficult to
eradicate because they usually rest on plausible and persuasive grounds
and that attributing their tenacity primarily to narrowly selfish interests
13. 50 CONGo REe. 3775·76 (1913).
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underestimates their staying power by disregarding an important source
of their strength.
In particular, I will focus on two subjects: the relationship of complex-
ity to tax reform and the difficulty of measuring the impact of exclusions,
deductions, credits and other special tax allowances.
At the end of President Carter's first year in office, the Treasury Depart-
ment released a pamphlet entitled "Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform," with
a foreword in which Secretary Simon said: "It is time to start over from
scratch and develop a new tax system in the United States. It must be a
system that is . . . based on a clear and consistent set of prinCiples, which
everyone in the United States can understand." 14 In this vein, the
Treasury offered the public a choice between "two specific model tax
systems." One is based on income like the existing federal income tax,
but with a much broader base, integration of the personal and corporate
taxes, full taxation of capital gains, an adjustment for inflation, and other
important reforms. The other model is an expenditures tax, based on the
dollar amount of goods and services purchased and consumed, by the tax-
payer. Responding to the President's assertion that the existing tax law is a
"disgrace," the Treasury naturally wished to transform the Internal Revenue
Code into a thing of beauty, worthy of a place of honor in the Statutes at
Large.
Both of the Treasury's new models attracted a good deal of interest and
praise in academic circles, but so far as Capitol Hill was concerned, they
were DOA-dead on arrival. Some of you may have seen a recent cartoon
in the New Yorker, in which a patron of a neighborhood bar says to his
drinking companion: "For thirty years I never thought about the Panama
Canal, and now I find that I can't live without it." In the same vein,
many Congressmen and their constituents might have said: "For thirty
years I have denounced the complexities of the Internal Revenue Code,
and now I find that I can't live without them."
When tax reforms fail, journaIists and academicians customarily put the
blame on "special interests"-groups determined to enact, preserve or
expand their own tax privileges, without regard to the common interest.





I would be the first to agree that political power, exercised in support of
economic interests, is an important part of the story, although I would add
that some of the special interests seeking to preserve particular provisions
encompass hundreds of thousands of taxpayers, who have considerable
14. TREAsURY DEPT., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (foreword) (1977).
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political clout even though very few of them are named John D. Rockefeller
or Henry Ford. But political influence and entrenched economic in-
terests are only part of the story, and perhaps not even the most important
part.
In the course of writing what will become, if I survive, a multivolume
treatise on federal taxation, I have had a close encounter with almost every
substantive provision of the Internal Revenue Code. I wish to report,
however damaging this iconoclastic conclusion may be to my reputation,
that they make far more sense than one is led to expect by most popular
and some expert opinions on the subject. To be brief-at the risk of
being misunderstood-what comes across to me is a surprisingly high level
of rationality, judicious compromise, and concern with important social
va:lues. To be sure, these favorable attributes are often buried in turgid
prose, qualified by excessive detail, and accompanied by indefensible
provisions. Taking the Code as a whole, however, it may well be preferable
to a tax law that will "wipe the slate clean of personal tax preferences,
special deductions and credits, exclusions from income and the like," as
Secretary Simon recommended in his foreword to Blueprints. Indeed,
when push came to shove, the Treasury itself "considered practical real-
ities" and preserved in its model income tax law a good many "special
deductions" and other tax allowances-though not nearly enough to pla-
cate Congress. It is difficult to wipe the slate clean, in my view, because
this would require the repeal of too many provisions that ordinary citizens,
even when they have no direct financial stake in their perpetuation, regard
as fair and sensible. I would like to illustrate this heterodox claim by
examining the credit allowed by existing law for expenses incurred by
working parents for the care of their minor children, an allowance whose
statutory predecessor was enacted in 1954 over the opposition of many
tax reformers.15
First, a few words about the pre-1954 law, which still controls the tax
treatment of expenditures that do not meet the standards of the statutory
credit or that exceed its dollar limits. In the leading case on the subject,
the Tax Court, which was upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held that a two-job married couple could not deduct, as
a business expense under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, the cost
of nursemaids employed to care for their young child during working
hours.16 The court said that the couple's child care expenses bore only
an "indirect and tenuous" relationship to their employment, and it ex-
pressed fear that allowing a deduction would take the IRS and the courts
down a slippery slope, ending in tax deductions for the employed tax-
payer's food, clothing and shelter.
15. l.R.C. § 44A (1954), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 504(a)( 1), 90 Stat. 1563.
. 16. Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), affd without opinion, 113 F.2d
114 (2d Cir. 1940). .
HeinOnline -- 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 196 1978
196 CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
The analogy was not entirely persuasive. Food, clothing and shelter
are necessary whether one is employed or not. By contrast, the child
care expenses incurred by the taxpayers before the court were necessary
only because they were both employed, and they would evidently not have
been incurred if one or both of them had been able to stay at home. On the
other hand, the child care expenses resulted from the couple's earlier per-
sonal decision to have children (and to keep them rather than put them
up for adoption); thus, they differed from such ordinary and necessary
business expenses as the cost of occupational uniforms, tools of the trade
and union dues, and this is why so many tax theorists objected to the
allowance.
Whether the court was right or wrong in refusing to allow child
care expenses to be deducted, its decision obviously discouraged married
couples with small children from seeking dua!l employment. Assume, for
example, that one spouse is already employed at $15,000 per year and
that the other spouse has an opportunity to earn the same amount, but only
if they are willing to pay $6,000 a year for a nursemaid or day care center
to take care of their children. If the expenses cannot be deducted, their
taxable income will rise by $15,000, but after defraying their child care
expenses, they will net only $9,000 more in cash-in fact, less than that
when they take into account the secondary breadwinner's social security
taxes, increased cost of lunches and clothing, and reduced opportunities to
shop for bargains-not to mention the additional income tax liability which
will be incurred by adding this second income to the first and thereby
subjecting it to a higher marginal rate.
When Congress decided to intervene in this area in 1954, it was faced
with a choice of alternatives. It could have reduced or eliminated the dis-
parity just described by taxing one-job married couples on the value of the
household services performed by the stay-at-home spouse. Had this
route been chosen, our couple would have to report $21,000 of income
if only one spouse worked ($15,000 of wage income and $6,000 of imputed
income from domestic services in caring for the children). Since their
income would rise to $30,000 if both were employed, the difference in tax-
able income between one job and two would be $9,000, which is the amount
of additional cash generated by the second job after paying the nurse-
maid or day care center.
Although the theory of this solution is widely approved by economists,
virtually no one thinks that it is feasible. It would not only entail con-
troversial and abrasive valuations by the IRS of unpaid domestic services,
but it would also require taxes to be paid for engaging in activities that,
however valuable, do not produce any cash. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that Congress chose in 1954 to reduce the tax bias against dual employ-
ment by allowing two-job married couples to deduct their child care ex-
penses, rather than by taxing one-job married couples on the imputed
value of their unpaid domestic services. In recommending this approach,
HeinOnline -- 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 197 1978
1978] TAX REFORM 197
the legislative committees said that a two-job married couple's child care
expenses are "comparable to an employee's business expenses." 17 I dare
say that most informed citizens would agree, not merely those who derive
a personal benefit from the statutory allowance.
The 1954 legislation, however, did not grant full-Hedged business ex-
pense treatment to child care expenses. Even today, despite a number
of liberalizing amendments in the intervening years, their status is inferior
to that of ordinary business expenses. Business expenses are deductible
regardless of amount, subject only to a vague requirement of reasonable-
ness and, in the case of travel and entertainment expenses, to a dis-
allowance of lavish and extravagant amounts. By contrast, there is a dollar
limit on the amount of child care expenses that can be taken into account
no matter how much the taxpayer may actually spend. Moreover, when
the deduction enacted in 1954 was converted into a credit in 1976, Con-
gress imposed a percentage limit on the tax benefit to be derived from the
expenses that are taken into account. Without going into the arithmetic,
I will simply say that for some low income taxpayers the tax benefit from
child care expenses is greater than the benefit from an equal amount of
business expenses; that for most middle- and upper-income taxpayers, they
are less beneficial than business expenses; and that the bias against child
care expenses increases as the taxpayers move up the income ladder.
Thus, when top bracket taxpayers incur $4,000 of travel and entertainment
expenses in a business or profession, the deduction reduces the taxpayer's
federal income tax liability by $2,800; but the same amount of qualified
child care expenses will generate only $800 of tax savings.
Why this bias against child care expenses, relative to the status of
ordinary business expenses? Having said that child care expenses "are
comparable to business expenses" and constitute "a cost of earning in-
come," 18 why has Congress not given them full business expense status?
The answer, I presume, lies in the fact that child care expenses, even if
incurred solely to enable both parents to work, inevitably relieve them
of the obligation of caring for their children in person. For some working
parents, of course, this may be an unpleasant feature of dual employment;
they may yearn to spend more time with their children. Others, however,
may welcome this respite; after all, many parents hire domestic servants to
care for their children or put them in day care centers even though they are
not compelled to do so by business or occupational exigencies.
17. S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954). See also Senate Comm. on
Finance, Revenue Act of 1971, S. REp. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1971] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1918, 1966 ("Domestic help expenses can to
some extent be likened to an employee business expense."); Senate Comm. on Finance,
Tax Reform Act of 1976, S. REp. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CoDE CONGo & An. NEWS 3439, 3565 (Child care expenses "should be
viewed as a cost of earning income.").
18. See note 17 supra.
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But child care expenses are not the only business-induced expenditures
with a personal component that is viewed with pleasure by some taxpayers
and revulsion by others. Travel and entertainment expenses have the same
chameleon-like features; some taxpayers welcome the opportunity to travel
on business and may even gravitate to occupations that require frequent
travel. For other taxpayers, however, a business trip may be unrelieved
tedium. Since it is not feasible to separate the sheep from the goats,
Congress has chosen to allow all taxpayers to deduct their business-induced
travel and entertainment expenditures, whether they enjoy the activity or
not, subject to certain restrictions to reduce abuse.
In the case of child care expenses, however, Congress has chosen to
compromise: taxpayers get a tax savings whether they are pleased or
depressed at being relieved of the obligation to care for their children, but
the amount of the savings is strictly limited. The bias against child care
expenses is greatest in the case of high income taxpayers, perhaps on the
tacit assumption that they are more likely to enjoy being relieved of the
burden of looking after their children in person than are low income tax-
payers. As to the validity of this distinction, I defer to the social psycho-
logists.
In describing the tax allowance for child care expenses, I have been
referring to married couples, but they are not, of course, the only tax-
payers incurring expenses of this type. Divorced, widowed and other un-
married parents also often have to pay for the care of their children during
working hours. Moreover, children are not the only dependents re-
quiring care. Taxpayers who are responsible for elderly parents and other
disabled relatives may be unable to work unless they hire domestic
servants to care for their dependents.
Congress recognized both of these points in 1954. Although the prin-
cipal impetus for enacting a tax allowance was the plight of the two-job
married couple with young children, the provision was never limited to
this group of taxpayers, and the circle of qualifying taxpayers and de-
pendents has been enlarged several times since 1954. But the tax allowance
has never been open-ended: expenditures to care for a disabled friend or
distant relative, for example, do not qualify.
In many families, children of high school 'age look after their younger
brothers and sisters, particularly between the end of the school day and
the time when their parents get home from work. Building on this fact of
life, some taxpayers sought to treat weekly allowances paid by them to
their older children as deductible child care expenses. Although these
amounts, if deducted by the parents, would be includible in the children's
gross income as compensation for services, there would ordinarily be no
tax liability because the recipient's gross income would be below the tax-
able Hoor.
Congress intervened in 1971 to forbid a deduction in this situation,
presumably on the theory that the weekly allowance would usually be paid
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in any event, whether the older children took care of the younger ones or
not. Although this rationale is plausible, the resulting statutory dis-
qualification of payments to certain members of the family means that
neighbors can deduct payments to each other's children, but not payments
to their own. On the stated ground that "[r]elatives generally provide
superior attention," Congress softened this prohibition to some extent in
1976,19 but it continues to bar most payments to the taxpayer's children.
Throughout this discussion, I have referred to expenses incurred to enable
the taxpayer to accept employment outside the home, but the shoe may be
on the other foot. Instead of hiring a baby-sitter so that he or she can work,
the taxpayer may work in order to hire a baby-sitter. Nothing short of
psychoanalysis or a truth serum, if 'that, can disclose with assurance whether
a particular taxpayer's expenses fall in the hire-to-work, or the work-to-
hire, category. As an indirect way of disallowing expenses incurred by
taxpayers who work primarily or solely to rid themselves of child care
responsibilities, current law provides that expenses cannot be taken into
account if, and to the extent that, they exceed the taxpayer's earned income;
in the case of married couples, the limiting amount is the lesser of their
separate earned incomes.
This restriction is evidently based on a tacit assumption that if the tax-
payer earns less than the cost of caring for the children, the excess is a
'personal outlay, not a genuine business expense. But this solution to the
perceived problem is, at best, a rough and ready compromise. It is
entirely possible that the taxpayer expected in good faith to earn sub-
stantially more than the child care expenses, and that this expectation was
frustrated by illness, business competition or other extraneous circum-
stances. The restriction, therefore, is another example of the legislative
refusal to treat child care expenses as full-Hedged business expenses. A
taxpayer who incurs ordinary business expenses in excess of business in-
come can deduct the resulting loss from other income; child care expenses,
however, cannot be used to generate a deductible loss in similar circum-
stances.
A final aspect of the tax allowance for the care of dependents is worthy
of note. The allowance is (and has always been) -allowed only to tax-
payers with children or other qualifying dependents. Yet the cost of caring
for dependents is only one category of expenses that are created, or in-
creased, by employment outside the taxpayer's home. Two-job married
couples, whether they have children or other dependents or not, have less
time to maintain their homes, prepare meals and shop for bargains than
do one-job married couples. Unmarried employees who live alone are
subject to a similar disability as compared with single persons living on
19. See S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 133, reprinted in [1976) U.S.
CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 3439, 3566; and compare I.R.C. § 214(e)(4) (1975) (re-
pealed by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 504(b), 90 Stat. 1565)
with I.R.C. § 44A(b)(6).
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pensions or income from investments. Why not, then, permit employed
taxpayers to deduct all expenses that are incurred in order to work, not
merely the cost of caring for their children and other qualifying dependents?
A moment's reflection will disclose the answer: such a broad tax allow-
ance could not be administered. Couple A might assert-quite plausibly-
that they spend $1,000 a year more for food because they have no time to
patronize supermarkets and must buy their supplies at expensive delicates-
sens and bakeries close to their offices. Couple B, with equal vigor, might
assert that they are so tired at the end of the day that they spend $3,000
more for restaurant meals than they would if one of them could stay home
and cook. Couple C might argue that their dual employment increased
their out-of-pocket expenses by $10,000 because it prevented them from
building their own home, raising their own fruits and vegetables and
weaving their own clothes.
In point of fact, some taxpayers would undoubtedly prefer to lead a do-
it-yourself life, outside the market economy, if they were not deprived of
time and energy by the requirements of their jobs. For them, expenditures
for food, clothing and shelter are often as clearly caused or increased by
their employment as the child care expenses incurred by two-job married
couples. But there is no way to separate these claims from those that
would be advanced by impostors if Congress expanded the child care
allowance to cover all types of household expenses incurred by employees
because of their work. For this reason, when Congress wanted to do
something to recognize the added living expenses of employed persons,
it confined itself to a token earned income credit, applicable on a percent-
age basis to a limited group of low-income taxpayers, which makes no
effort to determine the actual increase in the taxpayer's living expenses
attributable to employment.2o
From 1954 until 1972, the tax allowance for cMld care expenses dis-
tinguished between the costs of caring for children and other qualified
dependents and the costs of household services, such as cleaning the house
and preparing meals; only the former were deductible. (Whether this
legal distinction was in fact enforced is another matter.) In 1972, how-
ever, the distinction was abandoned.21 The result is that taxpayers with
children or other qualifying dependents can get a tax allowance for
household services even if the cost is unrelated to the children or de--
pendents. Similar expenses incurred by other employed taxpayers are
not deductible.
I have reviewed these aspects of section 44A of the Code to illustrate
two points:
20. I.R.C. § 43.
21. Compare I.R.C. § 214(a) (1971) with I.R.C. § 214(a)(2) (1972) (repealed
by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 504(b), 90 Stat. 1565) and I.R.C.
~ 44A(c)(2)(A).
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(1) Tax allowances almost always serve objectives that can muster
wide support among citizens of good will and common sense, .even though
they derive no personal benefits from them. A corollary of this proposi-
tion is that tax reformers make a serious tactical error in thinking and
charging that the principal barrier to change is a coalition of narrow
vested interests.
(2) In achieving these objectives, it is almost always necessary to
compromise among conHicting values, and the resulting statutory details,
no matter how complicated, are rarely capricious or absurd. A corollary
of this proposition is that simplification will often produce a less equitable
compromise. All things considered, a change may be desirable, but it will
often be a lesser evil, rather than an unalloyed improvement on the status
quo.
I realize, of course, that I have presented these claims to you as broad
generalizations, after dissecting only one illustrative tax allowance; so that
I am skating-and asking you to skate-on thin ice. For what it is worth,
however, I offer you my conviction that substantially the same conclusions
would be reached by a similar, provision-by-provision analysis of the entire
Code..
I would like to tum now to a very different aspect of our federal income
tax system: the fact that we are deplorably ignorant of the actual economic
consequences of most of its provisions-especially so-called special tax
allowances, such as the exclusion of certain items from gross income, deduc-
tions designed to stimulate investment or other activities and credits. Once
again, I will illustrate my thesis with only a single example.
As is well known; investors in state and municipal bonds are not taxed
on the interest received by them. (When enacted in 1913, the exclusion
was thought by some to be compelled by the Constitutional distinction
between states and the federal government, but the exclusion has been
perpetuated as a device to assist states and their political subdivisions in
financing their operations with borrowed funds.) Tax theorists are tradi-
tionally hostile to the exclusion, arguing that it creates an unjustified dif-
ference in tax liability among taxpayers who are otherwise similarly sit-
uated. Indeed, the standard classroom example of a violation of horizontal
equity entails a comparison of A and B, both subject to a marginal tax rate
of 7C11J, each of whom realizes an additional $1,000 of interest income.
Because A invests in taxable industrial bonds, he pays a tax of $700 and is
left with $300; B, being more tax conscious, invests in tax-exempt bonds
of equal risk, so his $1,000 of interest is unscathed by any tax liability.
Students sometimes ask why they should be disturbed by this compar-
ison, since the example implies that A suffers from a self-inflicted wound.
He is a fool, they suggest, not a victim; let him follow B's example, and
the alleged inequity will vanish. Whatever may be the reason for the
persistent failure of some taxpayers to take advantage of tax allowances
that are open to them, the instructor usually answers student objections
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to his example by asserting that A should not be forced into investments
he did not want in order to get on a plane of equality with B.
Instructors sometimes round out this reply with a concession that some-
what undermines the force of the original example: that the interest rate
on tax-exempt bonds is lower than the rate on comparable industrial
bonds, so that if A switches from taxable to tax-free bonds, his return
will be less than $1,000. On hearing this, alert students of course ask "How
much less?" And students wanting to back the instructor into a corner-
and what red-blooded American law student doesn't?-will go on to argue
that the investor who was getting 10% from industrial bonds will be willing
to buy tax-exempt bonds if they pay 3% (or a bit better), since for a
taxpayer subject to a marginal rate of 70%, 3% tax-free is the same as 10%
taxable. Assuming, therefore, that competitive conditions prevail in the
market and that all tax-exempt bonds offered are purchased by top-
bracket taxpayers, the interest rate on exempt bonds will be only 3% if
industrial bonds of equal risk pay 10%. Thus, if A has $10,000 to invest,
he will get $1,000 a year if he buys taxable industrial bonds, of which he
can keep $300 after taxes; but, if he switches to tax-exempt bonds, his
$10,000 investment will produce an annual yield of only 3%, or $300,
tax-free.
On these heroic assumptions, the entire benefit of the tax exemption will
pass through to the borrowers: cities and states will be able to borrow
at 3%, while taxable borrowers will have to pay 10% to sell bonds of equal
risk. Investors, on the other hand, will derive no benefit from the tax
exemption, since their economic position will be the same whether they
buy tax-free bonds and keep the 3% yield, or buy taxable bonds, get 10%,
pay their taxes and keep 3%. Though they claim the exemption, they are
only conduits through which the benefit passes to the borrowers.
If we tum now to real life, we find that the interest rate on tax-exempt
bonds is not 3% when comparable industrials pay 10%; it is more like 5%
or 6%. In the view of most economists, this relationship reflects the fact
that cities and states have had in recent years a virtually insatiable
appetite for funds, leading them to flood the market with tax-exempt
bonds. But this process is inherently self-destructive; if the supply of
bonds is so great that they are not all purchased by top-bracket tax-
payers, the borrowers must appeal to taxpayers in ever lower tax
brackets, and this requires higher rates of interest than 3%. For tax-
payers subject to a 40% marginal tax rate, for example, industrial bonds
paying 10% produce a net return after taxes of 6%; so they will not buy
tax-exempt bonds unless they also offer a 6% return. Hence, to bring
these taxpayers into the tax-exempt bond market, the interest rate will
have to be boosted from 3~nough to attract the top-bracket investors-
to 6%-the rate which will attract lawyers, dentists and other plebeian
investors.
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Once this happens, however, the top-bracket taxpayers, who would have
been content with 3%, get a windfall, since all tax-exempt bonds, not merely
the ones offered to lawyers and doctors, will be paying 6%. In effect, the
tax benefit trickles up. The lawyers and dentists (subject to a 40% tax
rate in my illustration) will get no benefit from the exemption, since for
them there is no differentiation between 10% taxable and 6% exempt. But
taxpayers subject to higher marginal tax rates-5O%, 60% and, especially,
70%--will derive benefits, and the amount of the benefit will rise with
income. But even the top-bracket taxpayers will not get the full benefit
of the exclusion. It will be shared by them with cities and states, who will
be able to borrow at 6% when comparable industrial bonds must pay 10%.
Having sketched these two types of responses to tax allowances-one
involving competition that transfers the entire tax benefit from the private
lenders to the cities and states who issue the exempt bonds; the second
involving a partial transfer of the exemption through competition, so that
it is shared by the taxpayers with the cities and states-I now want to
describe a third situation, in which the entire benefit of the tax allowance
is retained by the taxpayer.
An example of this third situation is the extra personal exemption of $750
per year to which blind taxpayers are currently entitled. It is conceivable
that a minuscule part of this exemption is competed away; since blind
taxpayers must prove that they meet the statutory requirements, the
resulting demand for expert testimony may increase slightly the fees
charged by ophthalmologists. With this trivial exception-which I offer
only to prove that I have considered this matter thoroughly-the tax
benefit of the extra exemption is not only claimed, but is also retained by
blind taxpayers. ~
Unfortunately, we know precious little about the actual impact of most
tax allowances. vVe can only guess at whether they are retained in full
by the taxpayer, competed away in full or shared. And if the benefit is
shared, we know almost nothing about the proportion retained by the
taxpayer. Very few allowances have been systematically examined by
econometricians; the few studies that there are have not yielded unam-
biguous and generally accepted results.
Given this melancholy state of our knowledge, it is not surprising that
journalists and politicians assume that tax allowances inure wholly to the
benefit of the taxpayer claiming the allowance. Tax theorists know better,
but they often employ the same assumption in their public utterances. As
a tactic in the political arena, this is understandable. Academicians like
to appear decisive, not vacillating. Nevertheless, ignorance is ignorance,
whether it is acknowledged or not, and that is, alas, our intellectual state
as to the economic consequences of most tax allowances. Among other
things, this means that the federal income tax system may not have the
effects that are often attributed to it, and that modifications may not pro-
duce the changes that their proponents seek to achieve.
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C. WHAT NEXT?
In discussing the future, I want to disclaim, firmly and without qualifi-
caticn, any prophetic expertise. Having done so, I can freely offer you,
also firmly and without qualification, my predictions.
I think, to 00 blunt, that we will see a series of so-called tax reform bills
and laws, which will not Significantly change the face of the Internal Rev-
enue Code. In the last decade, we have had three such statutes: the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the Tax Reduction
and Simplification Act of 1977. Except for their pretentious titles, these
recent laws were not much different from many other statutes enacted by
Congress over the years to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or
its predecessor, the 1939 Code.
In saying this, I do not want to denigrate the importance of the 1969,
1976 or 1977 Acts. Each made some significant changes in the law, sim-
plifying some areas and complicating others. The 1969 Act cut back on
percentage depletion, previously regarded as a sacred cow, reduced the
tax advantages of long-term capital gains, added the minimum tax on tax
preferences, and imposed severe restrictions on private foundations. The
1976 Act repealed the long-standing rules under which inherited property
acquired a new basis equal to its value at the date of the decedent's death
and substituted complex carryover basis rules, limited many tax shelter
opportunities, and imposed restrictions on deductions for vacation homes
and offices in the taxpayer's residence. The 1977 Act converted the op-
tional standard deduction into the new zero bracket amount and made
related changes that are expected to reduce by 7.3 million the number of
returns with itemized personal deductions.
All of these provisions, which constitute only a few of the changes made
by these three acts, are of great importance; but, when all is said and
done, they do not begin to approach the massive simplification that many
tax theorists have in mind when they advocate tax reform. I say this
even though the Tax Reform Act of 1969 has been called "the most com-
prehensive substantive reform of the federal income tax law since its
inception in 1913." 22 This characterization is probably valid when the
1969 Act is compared with what went before, but it is an assemblage of
minor (although complicated) details when compared with the vision of
comprehensive tax reform that is usually conjured up by tax reformers.
In the interest of realism, it should also be said that the 1969 Act's status
as the most comprehensive reform since 1913 may be equally valid when
we look back at it ten years from now.
Congress, in my view, will continue to lurch from side to side as it has
in the past. To give more content to this prediction, I would like to dis-
cuss some of the tactics of reform that have been employed in the past
22. 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANmL &: H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 25 (1972).
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and that we can expect to see in the future. In this analysis, I will be
concerned only with devices to prune or eliminate existing exclusions,
deductions, credits and other tax allowances. I see no reason to believe,
however, that Congress will not simultaneously add new allowances to the
Code-the educational tuition tax credit now being considered is an
example-which will in tum become candidates for expansion and contrac-
tion from time to time. Let me tum, then, to the major categories of tax
refurm devices.
( 1) Repeal. The most drastic legislative action that Congress can
take is, of course, repeal of a particular tax provision. This relatively rare
fate befell the 4% credit allowed by the 1954 Code for dividends received
by individuals, which was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1964.23 The
repeal was accompanied, as is not uncommon, by a sweetener, in the form
of an increase in the dividend exclusion from $50 to $100.
The 1964 repeal of the dividends-received credit illustrates another fact
of life: eliminating symptoms does not cure disease, whether the disease
is of organic or psychosomatic origin. When enacting the 4% dividends-
received credit in 1954, Congress said that it was addressing the problem
of the double taxation of corporate earnings. Without commenting on the
validity of the underlying complaint, I simply point out that the 1964
repeal of the credit did not terminate the debate. As many people know,
it flared up again last year; and, although legislation to integrate the cor-
porate and personal income taxes does not seem imminent, the area cer-
tainly will not remain quiescent in perpetuity.
(2) Phase-in and grandfather clauses. Another tactic that is often
employed when tax allowances are repealed isa gradual phase-in of the new
law or a grandfather clause preserving the old law for taxpayers who
may have relied on it. When Congress repealed the unlimited charitable
deduction in 1969, for example, the change took effect in a series of steps
over a five-year period. A similar policy of gradualism was employed
in 1975, when the percentage depletion rate for oil and gas was reduced
from 22% to 15% in stages over a ten-year period. Grandfather clauses are
also not unusual. When Congress in 1976 repealed the tax exemption of
disability pensions received by members of the armed forces, for example,
it made the repeal inapplicable to anyone who was a member of the armed
forces on September 24, 1975, or who was then under a binding commit-
ment to join.
Phase-in and grandfather clauses are a method of purchasing political
acquiescence in tax reform measures, but they are also advocated by some
tax theorists as devices to avoid imposing a capital levy on taxpayers who
purchased tax-sheltered property (or entered into other commitments) at
23. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19. The "deadwood"
portion (Title XIX) of the Tax Refonn Act of 1976 repealed a great many obsolete
statutory provisions, but this cleanup operation was concerned with debris that had
accumulated over decades, not with currently important tax allowances.
HeinOnline -- 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 206 1978
206 CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
a price reflecting an expectation that the tax allowance would continue.24
A tax-exempt bond with an interest rate of 6%, for example, would ob-
viously not sell for $1,000 were it not for the tax exemption, if comparable
taxable industrial bonds carry a 10% rate of return. Proposals to repeal
the exemption, therefore, are usuaUy limited to future issues.
Concessions of this type can be viewed as corollaries to the point I
made in the previous section, i.e., that some tax allowances are competed
away so that the nominal taxpayer is only a channel through whom the
tax benefit passes, in whole or in part, to other persons. In these circum-
stances, the most equitable way to repeal the allowance might be to allocate
the future cost between the taxpayers and the other beneficiaries of the
allowance in proportion to their enjoyment of its benefits. As I pointed
out before, however, we know little about ,the real-life division of benefits
-some tax allowances may be competed away in their entirety; others are
shared in unknown proportions between taxpayers and other persons; and
still other allowances inure wholly to the benefit of the taxpayer who
claims them.
Moreover, the extent to which the tax allowance is capitalized or other-
wise reflected in market transactions between the taxpayer and other per-
sons depends on their expectations about the allowance's permanence.
If taxpayers believed that Congress was on the verge of repealing the tax
exemption for existing state and mUnicipal bonds, new issues would have
to carry an interest rate commensurate with the death sentence. Tax-
payers who had little faith in continued tax exemption would pay cor-
respondingly little for transitory immunity. But just as we know little
about the extent to which tax benefits are shared among the participants
in a tax-sheltered business or financial transaction, so we know little about
how much is paid for expectations in this area. Tax allowances are some-
times portrayed as immortal, but do taxpayers make this assumption in
real life? If not-if 'they gamble against repeal-is there any reason to
protect them with grandfather clauses?
(3) Flanking devices. A third tax reform tactic is to leave a tax allow-
ance in force without direct change, but to sap its vitality by a flanking
movement. This tactic has been used repeatedly to undermine the itemized
personal deductions (medical expenses, charitable contributions, casualty
losses, interest, taxes, etc.); although so far confined to this area, it could
be applied elsewhere as well. I am referring, of course, to the optional
standard deduction, which was converted in 1977, with little substantive
change, into the zero bracket amount. I will use the provision's old label,
because it is more familiar and also more descriptive of its function.
24. See Feldstein, Compensation in Tax Refo-rm, 29 NATL TAX J. 123 (1976);
Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U.
PA. L. REv. 47 (1977).
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As you know, taxpayers are offered a choice between itemizing their
personal deductions (along with a few business deductions) and taking
the standard deduction. This option was enacted in 1944 to simplify the
preparation and audit of personal tax returns. Taxpayers who know that
they will elect the standard deduction do not have to keep records of
their personal deductions, and their tax returns, like their desks, are free
of clutter. When enacted, the optional' standard deduction was subject to
a ceiling of $500 and was elected by about 82% of individual taxpayers. But
as time passed, incomes and deductible personal expenses rose dramatically,
and more and more taxpayers found it profitable to itemize rather than to
take the standard deduction. Congress repeatedly raised the standard
deduction to recapture its lost customers, but they would then drift away
again and become itemizers, as incomes and deductible personal expenses
increased once more.
The most recent~but surely not the last-episode in this cyclical pattern
occurred in 1977, when the standard deduction was increased in amount
and converted into the zero bracket amount with the objective of increas-
ing its patronage by 7.3 million taxpayers. The resulting simplification of
their returns greatly reduces the audit burden for the IRS, but there are
offsetting costs that should be taken into account in assessing the merits
of this method of sidestepping tax allowances that Congress does not wish
to attack directly.
First, the direct revenue cost is very great, since the increased standard
deduction is available not only to taxpayers who wouM otherwise have
itemized their personal deductions, but also to the much larger group who
would not have itemized in any event. The 1977 change, for example, is
expected to increase the percentage of taxpayers choosing the standard
deduction from 69% to 77%.25 Thus, almost 90% (69/77) of the taxpayers
who get the benefit of the increase would have chosen the standard deduc-
tion anyway. In this respect, therefore, an increase in the standard deduc-
tion resembles an increase in the interest rate on tax-exempt bonds, which
produces the "trickle up" phenomenon described in the previous section,
except that most of the benefits of an increased standard deduction trickle
down, since the non-itemizers are mostly low-income taxpayers.
A second consequence of sidestepping the personal deductions by in-
creasing the standard deduction is to frustrate the policy objectives of
the personal deductions. To Hlustrate this point, assume that two married
couples have identical amounts of income and 'are similarly situated in all
other respects, except that one family incurs $3,200 of deductible medical
expenses or casualty losses. Were it not for the standard deduction, the
family with the medical expenses and casualty losses would have a lower
tax liability, reflecting what Congress-and no doubt much of the public-
regards as a reduced ability to pay. But a standard deduction of $3,200
25. See S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 118, reprinted in [1976] u.s.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439, 3553.
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is available to the other family, thus eliminating any tax difference between
the two families. 26 Every time Congress increases the standard deduction,
it necessarily blurs the distinction between taxpayers who incur deductible
expenses and those who do not.
Increases in ,the standard deduction also undermine the incentive effect
of tax allowances that are designed to alter taxpayer behavior. This effect
can be illustrated by assuming that the family just described, with $3,200
of deductible medical expenses and casua,lty losses, is solicited in December
to make a contribution to a charitable organization. If they donate $SOO
to charity, they will be able to deduct $3,500. Since the zero bracket
amount would be only $3,200, it is advantageous for them to itemize. Thus,
the charitable contribution produces a tax benefit, and this serves as an
incentive to make the contribution. If Congress increases the standard
deduction to $3,500, however, and all other circumstances remain the same,
a charitable contribution of $300 will produce no tax benefit, and they
will be less likely to make it.
These effects of 'the standard deduction suggest that increasing efforts
will be made to shield some itemized deductions from nullification by
permitting them to be taken in addition to the standard deduction. This
change has already been effected for alimony, and charitable organizations
are lobbying for a credit or other allowance for charitable contributions
that will be independent of the standard deduction. The standard deduc-
tion, I suggested earlier, is a method of outRanking the itemized deduc-
tions. Now we are seeing an effort to restore some of the itemized deduc-
tions by outRanking the standard deduction.
Finally, it should be noted ,that increases in the standard deduction
eliminate the need to keep records of personal deductions only for tax-
I payers who are absolutely sure that their itemized deductions will not
exceed the standard deduction. Many taxpayers, however, do not know
unti>! after the end of the taxable year whether itemizing will be preferable
to the optional standard deduction, so they must keep records or lose out.
(4) Minimum tax on tax preferences. Another tax reform tactic is the
minimum tax on tax preferences, enacted in 1969 and materially revised
in 1976. BrieRy summarized, the minimum tax is imposed on taxpayers
who receive a substantial amount of certain tax preference items, such as
capital gains, percentage depletion, stock options, accelerated depreciation
and certain personal deductions. The announced purpose is to insure that
at least a minimum amount of tax is paid on tax preference items, espe-
cially by high-income taxpayers who otherwise would pay little or no regular
income tax.
26. The standard deduotion or zero bracket amount could be rationalized as a
device to disallow a "normal" amount of personal items, on the theory that medical
expenses, casualty losses, etc., affect a family's ability to pay only if, in the aggregate,
they exceed the applicable standard deduction or zero bracket amount. But this is not
the announced function of either provision.
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Although the minimum tax may in fact have been enacted primarily for
its public relations or cosmetic effect, it is worth serious attention. As
applied to tax preference items that were enacted as investment or business
incentives, the minimum tax is a curious device. 1£ Congress wants to
encourage the construction of buildings, pollution control facilities and
other tax-favored investments, why boggle if new taxpayers move into
these areas in full force? Why penalize them for getting more than ankle-
deep into the very waters that Congress is urging taxpayers to enter?
The answer, presumably, is that taxpayers who concentrate on tax-favored
investments do not pay as much in taxes as those who avoid those areas or
who patronize them sparingly. By tending to restrict the amount invested
by anyone high-income taxpayer in tax-preferred activities, the minimum
tax is expected to increase the effective tax rate on these taxpayers. If
other high-income taxpayers take up the slack by investments that are
small enough to qualify for the basic tax allowance without incurring the
penalty of a minimum tax,27 however, the aggregate cost of the basic al-
lowance to the Treasury may remain the same. Viewed as a method of
spreading a given amount of tax benefits among a larger circle of high-
income taxpayers, the minimum tax serves a cosmetic role in an area where
appearances can be more important than reality. Not much more can be
said in its favor.
It is also possible, however, that the minimum tax will cause the only
high-income taxpayers who are attracted by the tax-preferred activities to
curtail their participation, and that other high-income taxpayers will not
leap into the breach. In this event, the activity that Congress is seeking
to encourage will decline in volume, unless the rate of return offered by
these activities rises to the point where they become attractive to lower-
income taxpayers. If the latter condition prevaHs, the increased rate of
return will inure, gratuitously, to the benefit of any high-income taxpayers
who continue to invest in -the same tax-preferred activity. The result
would be a trickle-up phenomenon of the type which occurs when the
interest rate on tax-exempt bonds increases. This is hardly compatible with
the equity objective that prompted enactment of the minimum tax. So far
as I can recall, however, no tax economist has addressed this possibility
that the actual effect of the minimum tax is the opposite of its intended
effect.
(5) Channelization. Another tax reform tactic that has been employed
on several occasions in recent years, and that may be on the rise, is a
channelization of income and deductions, designed primarily to prevent
taxpayers from deducting expenses incurred in one activity from income
27. The minimum tax comes into force only if, and to the extent that, the taxpayer's
aggregate preference income (as defined) exceeds either $10,000 or one-half of the
taxpayer's regular tax liability, whichever is greater. See I.R.C. § 56(a) (1). [Note:
This does not take account of the proposed 1978 changes in the minimum tax; but they
do not undermine the criticism offered in the text.]
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derived from an unrelated profession or business. The details of these
reform measures vary, but the common thread is the preservation of par-
ticular tax allowances for full-time farmers, ranchers and other taxpayers
who participate directly in a tax-favored business or occupation, while
denying- or restricting use of the same allowance by passiv~ investors and
other part-timers, such as lawyers, orthodontists and accountants. The
emotional tone underlying these statutory distinctions is conveyed by refer-
ences to the deserving group as "genuine" or "dirt" farmers-no matter
how extensive or lucrative their agricultural operations may be. The re-
stricted taxpayers, by contrast, are described contemptuously as "outsiders"
or "white collar cowboys."
I have grave doubts about the wisdom of this distinction from a policy
point of view. Much can be said for permitting funds to How wherever
the investor thinks they will earn the greatest after-tax return. And if
Congress determines that farming or any other activity should enjoy a tax
allowance, I see no reason to reserve the benefits for those already in the
business, as against persons who wish to commit their funds to it. The
phrase "white collar cowboy" is catchy, but from an economic point of
view, does it make any sense to treat investments made by one taxpayer
differently from those made by another? The distinction, I might add,
has led Congress to create what might be called honorary, or birthright,
dirt farmers. By virtue of section 464(e )( 2), the special status given to
full-time farmers also shelters the farmer's uncles, aunts and cousins, even
if they are city slickers who don't know the difference between oats and
barley.
Whatever the defects of channelization devices may be, however, I ex-
pect their use to increase. They permit tax allowances to be preserved
for taxpayers who have become accustomed to them, while placating popu-
lar demands that "something be done." There is always a market for
superficial remedies, and they are as American as the patent medicine man.
As applied to the Internal Revenue Code, however, these nostrums pro-
duce complexity, not simplification. Our existing tax system is, by and
large, a global system in the sense that all income is thrown into one pot,
aU deductions are then taken, and the residue is taxable income. Capital
gains and losses constitute the principal exceptions to the global concept;
they must be segregated for separate treatment, creating a host of defini-
tional problems. In contrast to our global system (which can rightly be
regarded as a major legacy from the founding fathers), the British used
to have a "schedular" income tax, involving separate computations of in-
come from the taxpayer's principal occupation or profession, income from
investments, income from farming and income from a number of other
activities, with a separate tax for each type of income. If channelization
becomes more frequent as a tax reform tactic, the global concept will
recede into the background, and we will get closer to the far more com-
plicated schedular system.
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To conclude this lecture series, I wish to say a few words about the
expenditure or consumption tax, which, as I said earlier, has been sug-
gested as a substitute for the federal income tax.28 The subject obviously
deserves extended discussion and, in fact, I had originally intended to
use these lectures as the occasion for an intensive analysis of its main
features. Having abandoned that plan, perhaps it would be wise to reo
main silent, for any brief comment runs the risk of superficiality.
Recognizing the risk, I still want to note that expenditure tax proposals
have so far been presented and discussed largely at a high level of ab-
straction. A few commentators have tried to put flesh on the skeleton,
but they have only begun the process.29 In this respect, the expenditure
tax resembles the federal personal income tax as of 1913, and as I pointed
out in my first lecture, most of the knotty problems that plague us today
in that area were not foreseen by the founding fathers. 80
I will content myself here with two examples of problems in the expen-
diture tax area paralleling problems that the founding fathers of the income
tax failed to address. Assuming a graduated rate schedule, it will make a
great difference whether expenditures are charged to parents or to their
children. Unless elaborate rules are adopted to prevent the practice,
wealthy families will be able to shift tax liability for ordinary living ex-
penses to their children by transferring property to them, directly or in
trust, to finance the expenditures. I can envision counter-measures, to be
sure, but they would add intricacies to a system that, so long as it remains
an ideal, can be described as simple and straightforward, as compared with
the existing income tax.
In the same vein, I call attention to the fact that an expenditure tax, like
its income tax counterpart, would have to separate taxable personal ex-
penditures from nontaxable business expenses. The three-martini lunch,
travel and entertainment expenses and child care expenses, for example,
would be as troublesome for, an expenditure tax as they are for the income
tax.
I could add to this list of expenditure tax problems, but this is not the
time or place for an extended disquisition. My purpose is not to indulge
in a final judgment on 'the expenditure tax concept, but to suggest that its
advocates should not offer a money-back guarantee until they can unveil
a far more detailed model than has been exhibited so far. Contemplation
of the gap between the income tax envisioned by the founding fathers and
today's law (whether it is a national disgrace or not) should provide a
sobering comparison.
28. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
29.ld.
30. See section A supra.
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